Cryptographic Protocol Coverage - TYCHON PQC Scanner

Coverage at a Glance

Protocol Families

100+

TLS Cipher Suites Probed

TLS/SSH Key Exchange Groups

35+

PQC/Hybrid Key Exchange Groups Detected

20+

NDJSON Event Datasets

30+

VPN Client Signatures

PQC Readiness terminology used throughout this document: safe Symmetric AES — resistant to Grover's algorithm at current key sizes | transitional Classical asymmetric — vulnerable to future Shor's algorithm, plan migration | vulnerable Broken or banned algorithm — migrate immediately | critical No encryption or SMBv1 — unacceptable posture

Network Protocols

TLS (all versions) & Certificate Scanning
SSH
SMB3 Encryption
SNMPv3
Kerberos Encryption Types
VPN Clients
IPSec
MACsec
IBM MQ Channel Encryption
NFS — Network File System

Host Crypto

X.509 Certificates (filesystem)
Keystores (JKS, PKCS12, etc.)
macOS Keychain Identities
Cryptographic Libraries (memory)
Quantum Readiness Assessment

Quick Reference

All NDJSON Event Datasets
PQC Assessment Matrix
Platform Coverage Matrix

TLS — Transport Layer Security (all versions)

All Platforms Active network probe STARTTLS tychon.cipher tychon.cipher_quick

The scanner performs a full TLS handshake against each target port, offering all known cipher suites and collecting the server's negotiated cipher, protocol version, certificate chain, and key exchange group. A fast-path probe (-cipherscanquick) collects the single negotiated suite without full enumeration.

▶TLS / SSL Versions Probed

Version	Status	PQC Readiness	Notes
`TLS 1.3`	Recommended	transitional	Only AEAD cipher suites; forward secrecy mandatory; supports PQC/hybrid key exchange groups
`TLS 1.2`	Acceptable	transitional	ECDHE/DHE suites with AEAD are acceptable; RSA key exchange and CBC are flagged
`TLS 1.1`	Deprecated	vulnerable	RFC 8996 deprecated; no AEAD; SHA-1 MACs common
`TLS 1.0`	Deprecated	vulnerable	RFC 8996 deprecated; BEAST/POODLE applicable; disable immediately
`SSLv3`	Broken	vulnerable	POODLE attack; RFC 7568 prohibited; any server supporting SSLv3 is flagged critical
`DTLS 1.2`	Acceptable	transitional	UDP-based TLS for VoIP, gaming, IoT; same cipher suite coverage as TLS 1.2

▶TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites (5 suites)

Suite Name	IANA ID	Encryption	HMAC	PQC Readiness
`TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`	0x1302	AES-256-GCM	AEAD	safe Recommended
`TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`	0x1303	ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD	safe
`TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`	0x1301	AES-128-GCM	AEAD	safe
`TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256`	0x1304	AES-128-CCM	AEAD	safe
`TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256`	0x1305	AES-128-CCM-8	AEAD	safe

Note: TLS 1.3 symmetric encryption is quantum-safe; however the key exchange (ECDH, DHE) is still classically-based and vulnerable to Shor's algorithm unless a PQC/hybrid group is used.

▶TLS 1.2 — Strong Suites (AEAD, forward secrecy)

Suite Name	IANA ID	Key Exchange	Encryption	MAC	PQC Readiness
`ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384`	0xC030	ECDHE	AES-256-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`	0xC02F	ECDHE	AES-128-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384`	0xC02C	ECDHE	AES-256-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`	0xC02B	ECDHE	AES-128-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305`	0xCCA8	ECDHE	ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD	transitional
`ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305`	0xCCA9	ECDHE	ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD	transitional
`DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384`	0x009F	DHE	AES-256-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`	0x009E	DHE	AES-128-GCM	AEAD	transitional
`DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305`	0xCCAA	DHE	ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD	transitional
`AES256-GCM-SHA384`	0x009D	RSA	AES-256-GCM	AEAD	vulnerable
`AES128-GCM-SHA256`	0x009C	RSA	AES-128-GCM	AEAD	vulnerable

▶TLS 1.2 / 1.1 / 1.0 — Legacy CBC Suites

Suite Name	IANA ID	Key Exchange	Encryption	MAC	PQC Readiness
`ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384`	0xC028	ECDHE	AES-256-CBC	SHA-384	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256`	0xC027	ECDHE	AES-128-CBC	SHA-256	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA`	0xC014	ECDHE	AES-256-CBC	SHA-1	vulnerable
`ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA`	0xC013	ECDHE	AES-128-CBC	SHA-1	vulnerable
`DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256`	0x006B	DHE	AES-256-CBC	SHA-256	transitional
`DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256`	0x0067	DHE	AES-128-CBC	SHA-256	transitional
`AES256-SHA256`	0x003D	RSA	AES-256-CBC	SHA-256	vulnerable
`AES128-SHA256`	0x003C	RSA	AES-128-CBC	SHA-256	vulnerable
`AES256-SHA`	0x0035	RSA	AES-256-CBC	SHA-1	vulnerable
`AES128-SHA`	0x002F	RSA	AES-128-CBC	SHA-1	vulnerable

▶Weak / Broken Cipher Suites (RC4, DES, 3DES, NULL, EXPORT)

Suite Name	IANA ID	Key Exchange	Encryption	Risk
`ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA`	0xC012	ECDHE	3DES-CBC	Critical
`DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA`	0x0016	DHE	3DES-CBC	Critical
`DES-CBC3-SHA`	0x000A	RSA	3DES-CBC	Critical
`RC4-SHA`	0x0005	RSA	RC4-128	Critical
`RC4-MD5`	0x0004	RSA	RC4-128	Critical
`ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA`	0xC011	ECDHE	RC4-128	Critical
`DES-CBC-SHA`	0x0009	RSA	DES-CBC	Critical
`NULL-MD5 / NULL-SHA`	0x0001/0x0002	RSA	None	Critical — No Encryption

▶Non-AES Symmetric Suites (Camellia, ARIA)

Suite Name	Key Exchange	Encryption	Origin Standard	PQC Readiness
`ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384`	ECDHE	Camellia-256-CBC	ISO/IEC 18033-3, RFC 6367	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256`	ECDHE	Camellia-128-CBC	ISO/IEC 18033-3	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384`	ECDHE	ARIA-256-GCM	Korean IETF RFC 6209	transitional
`ECDHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256`	ECDHE	ARIA-128-GCM	Korean IETF RFC 6209	transitional

▶TLS Key Exchange Groups — Full Handshake + Passive Detection

Group Name	ID	Type	PQC?	Detection Method	Standard
`X25519MLKEM768`	0x11EC	Hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768)	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203 + RFC 7748
`SecP256r1MLKEM768`	0x11EB	Hybrid (P-256 + ML-KEM-768)	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203 + FIPS 186-5
`SecP384r1MLKEM1024`	0x11ED	Hybrid (P-384 + ML-KEM-1024)	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203 + FIPS 186-5
`MLKEM512`	0x0200	Pure ML-KEM	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203
`MLKEM768`	0x0201	Pure ML-KEM	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203
`MLKEM1024`	0x0202	Pure ML-KEM	Yes	Full handshake	NIST FIPS 203
`BIKE-L1 / BIKE-L3 / BIKE-L5`	OQS	Code-based KEM	Yes	Passive HRR	OQS / IETF draft
`FrodoKEM-640/976/1344 (AES & SHAKE)`	OQS	Lattice KEM (conservative)	Yes	Passive HRR	OQS / IETF draft
`x25519_mlkem512, p256_mlkem512, bp256_mlkem512`	OQS	Hybrid ML-KEM (non-IANA)	Yes	Passive HRR	OQS draft
`bp384_mlkem768, p384_mlkem768, x448_mlkem768`	OQS	Hybrid ML-KEM (non-IANA)	Yes	Passive HRR	OQS draft
`bp512_mlkem1024, p521_mlkem1024`	OQS	Hybrid ML-KEM (non-IANA)	Yes	Passive HRR	OQS draft
`X25519`	0x001D	Classical ECDH	No	Full handshake	RFC 7748
`X448`	0x001E	Classical ECDH	No	Full handshake	RFC 7748
`secp256r1 (P-256)`	0x0017	NIST ECC	No	Full handshake	FIPS 186-5, RFC 8422
`secp384r1 (P-384)`	0x0018	NIST ECC	No	Full handshake	FIPS 186-5, RFC 8422
`secp521r1 (P-521)`	0x0019	NIST ECC	No	Full handshake	FIPS 186-5, RFC 8422
`ffdhe2048 – ffdhe8192`	0x0100–0x0104	Finite-Field DH	No	Full handshake	RFC 7919
`secp256k1`	0x0016	ECC (Bitcoin curve)	No	Full handshake	Non-NIST, legacy

Green rows: Scanner completes a full TLS 1.3 handshake as a PQC-capable client and records tychon.cipher_negotiation.kex.* fields including quantum_safe and cnsa_20_level. Blue rows: Server's required group is identified via passive TLS HelloRetryRequest parsing — TLS presence, cipher suite, and KEX group name are all captured without completing the handshake. Validated against all 721 ports of the Open Quantum Safe interop server.

▶STARTTLS Protocol Ports (TLS-upgraded plaintext)

Port	Protocol	STARTTLS Method
21	FTP	AUTH TLS
25	SMTP	STARTTLS
110	POP3	STLS
143	IMAP	STARTTLS
389	LDAP	STARTTLS
587	SMTP (submission)	STARTTLS
3306	MySQL	MySQL SSL handshake
5432	PostgreSQL	SSLRequest
6379	Redis	STARTTLS

SSH — Secure Shell

All Platforms Active network probe Port 22 (default) tychon.ssh

The scanner performs a full SSH handshake, collecting all negotiated algorithms for key exchange, host key type, symmetric encryption, and MAC. No authentication is attempted.

Algorithm Category	Algorithm Name	PQC Readiness	Notes
Key Exchange
Key Exchange	`curve25519-sha256`	transitional	Most deployed modern KEX; no PQC protection
Key Exchange	`ecdh-sha2-nistp256/384/521`	transitional	NIST ECC; forward secrecy; no PQC
Key Exchange	`diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256`	transitional	RFC 4419; group size determines classical security
Key Exchange	`diffie-hellman-group14-sha1`	vulnerable	SHA-1 MAC; 2048-bit DH; deprecated
Key Exchange	`diffie-hellman-group1-sha1`	broken	768-bit DH; LOGJAM applicable; disabled by default in modern OpenSSH
Host Key Type
Host Key	`ssh-ed25519`	transitional	EdDSA on Curve25519; modern default
Host Key	`ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521`	transitional	ECDSA; forward-secrecy for host auth
Host Key	`rsa-sha2-256 / rsa-sha2-512`	transitional	RSA host key with SHA-2; acceptable key sizes ≥3072
Host Key	`ssh-rsa`	vulnerable	RSA with SHA-1; deprecated RFC 8332
Symmetric Encryption
Encryption	`aes256-gcm@openssh.com`	safe Recommended	AES-256-GCM AEAD; preferred
Encryption	`aes128-gcm@openssh.com`	safe	AES-128-GCM AEAD
Encryption	`chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com`	safe	ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD; preferred on CPUs without AES-NI
Encryption	`aes256-ctr / aes192-ctr / aes128-ctr`	safe	AES-CTR; requires separate MAC; acceptable
Encryption	`aes256-cbc / aes128-cbc`	transitional	AES-CBC; Lucky13 risk if no EtM MAC
MAC
MAC	`hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com`	safe	Encrypt-then-MAC; preferred
MAC	`hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com`	safe Recommended	Encrypt-then-MAC; preferred
MAC	`hmac-sha1`	vulnerable	SHA-1 collision risk; deprecate
MAC	`hmac-md5`	broken	MD5 broken; disable immediately

SMB3 — Server Message Block Encryption

All Platforms Windows (registry augment) TCP network probe — port 445 tychon.non_tls_cipher

An SMB2 NEGOTIATE Request is sent to 127.0.0.1:445 offering all dialects 2.0.2 through 3.1.1. The server's NEGOTIATE Response is parsed for the negotiated dialect and, for SMB 3.1.1, the NegotiateContextList encryption cipher IDs. On Windows the LanmanServer EncryptData registry DWORD is also checked.

Detected State	Cipher / Condition	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk	Migration Priority
SMBv1 response	No encryption — SMBv1	vulnerable	Critical	Critical
SMB 2.0.2 / 2.1 negotiated	No encryption (SMB2 lacks native encryption)	vulnerable	High	High
SMB 3.0 / 3.0.2 negotiated	AES-128-CCM (only option)	safe	Low	Low
SMB 3.1.1 — AES-128-GCM	AES-128-GCM	safe	Low	Low
SMB 3.1.1 — AES-256-GCM	AES-256-GCM (preferred)	safe Recommended	Low	Low
SMB 3.1.1 — AES-128-CCM	AES-128-CCM	safe	Low	Low
SMB 3.1.1 — AES-256-CCM	AES-256-CCM	safe	Low	Low

Note: SMB symmetric encryption (AES-GCM/CCM) is quantum-safe. The primary risk is unencrypted SMBv1/v2 traffic which can be captured and replayed. Upgrade path: enable SMB 3.1.1 with EncryptData=1 (Windows) and prefer AES-256-GCM.

SNMPv3 — User-based Security Model (USM)

Linux macOS Windows (registry) Config parse: /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf Windows SNMP service registry Port 161 UDP tychon.non_tls_cipher

No active network probe is sent (USM responses require valid credentials). On Linux/macOS /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf is parsed for createUser directives, collecting auth and priv protocol names. On Windows the SNMP service registry key is checked — Windows SNMP supports only v1/v2c (community strings, no encryption).

Category	Protocol	USM Role	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk
Authentication
Insecure auth	`MD5`	Auth	vulnerable	Medium
Weak auth	`SHA / SHA-1`	Auth	vulnerable	Medium
Acceptable auth	`SHA-256`	Auth	transitional	Low
Acceptable auth	`SHA-384`	Auth	transitional	Low
Acceptable auth	`SHA-512`	Auth	transitional	Low
Privacy (Encryption)
Broken priv	`DES / CBC-DES`	Priv	vulnerable	Critical
Broken priv	`3DES / 3DES-EDE`	Priv	vulnerable	Critical
Acceptable priv	`AES-128 / CFB-AES-128`	Priv	safe	Low
Preferred priv	`AES-256 / CFB-AES-256`	Priv	safe Recommended	Low
Windows SNMP Service
SNMPv1/v2c only	Community string auth — no encryption	Both	vulnerable	Critical

Kerberos — Encryption Type Configuration

Windows (registry) Linux (/etc/krb5.conf) macOS (/etc/krb5.conf) Registry: SupportedEncryptionTypes bitmask Config parse: /etc/krb5.conf [libdefaults] Port 88 tychon.non_tls_cipher tychon.quantum_readiness

Windows reads SupportedEncryptionTypes from the Group Policy or LSA registry key (or infers the OS-version default). Linux/macOS parses /etc/krb5.conf [libdefaults] for permitted_enctypes, default_tkt_enctypes, and allow_weak_crypto. RC4-HMAC is exploitable via Kerberoasting (RFC 8429 deprecates it); DES is banned by CNSA 2.0.

Enctype	Bitmask Bit (Windows)	Category	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk
`DES-CBC-CRC`	0x01	Broken / banned	vulnerable	Critical
`DES-CBC-MD5`	0x02	Broken / banned	vulnerable	Critical
`RC4-HMAC`	0x04	Deprecated — Kerberoastable	vulnerable	Critical
`AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96`	0x08	Acceptable	transitional	Medium
`AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96`	0x10	Preferred	transitional	Medium
`AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA384-192`	krb5.conf only	Preferred (SHA-384)	transitional	Medium
`arcfour-hmac / arcfour-hmac-md5`	krb5.conf only	Deprecated — RC4 alias	vulnerable	Critical

Note: No PQC-native Kerberos standard exists as of 2026. AES-only configurations are classified transitional (symmetric AES resists Grover's algorithm) but remain vulnerable to Harvest Now, Decrypt Later for long-lived session tickets. Migration guidance will update as IETF/NIST publish PQC Kerberos extensions.

VPN Clients — Detection and Protocol Identification

All Platforms Process scan Registry (Windows) Config file parse tychon.vpn_client

VPN clients are detected by process name, registry presence, and configuration file paths. Tunnel protocol, cipher suite, and key exchange algorithm are extracted from config files when available.

VPN Client	Platforms	Primary Protocol	Detection Method
Cloudflare WARP	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard / MASQUE	Process, Registry, Config
Palo Alto GlobalProtect	Win / Mac / Linux	IPSec/IKEv2, SSL/TLS	Process, Registry, Config
Cisco AnyConnect / Secure Client	Win / Mac / Linux	DTLS, TLS, IPSec	Process, Registry, Config
Fortinet FortiClient	Win / Mac / Linux	SSL-VPN, IPSec/IKEv2	Process, Registry, Config
Zscaler Client Connector	Win / Mac / Linux	TLS, DTLS	Process, Registry
Check Point Endpoint Security	Win / Mac / Linux	IPSec, SSL-VPN	Process, Registry
WireGuard	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard (ChaCha20-Poly1305)	Process, Config (`wg0.conf`)
OpenVPN	Win / Mac / Linux	SSL/TLS over UDP/TCP	Process, Config (`.ovpn`)
Tailscale	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard	Process, Config
Ivanti Pulse Secure	Win / Mac	SSL-VPN	Process, Registry
NordVPN / NordLayer	Win / Mac / Linux	NordLynx (WireGuard), OpenVPN	Process, Config
Perimeter81 / Check Point Harmony	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard, IPSec	Process, Config
ProtonVPN	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard, OpenVPN, IKEv2	Process, Config
ExpressVPN	Win / Mac / Linux	Lightway (wolfSSL), OpenVPN	Process, Config
Surfshark	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard, OpenVPN, IKEv2	Process, Config
Windows Built-in VPN	Win	IKEv2, L2TP/IPSec, PPTP, SSTP	Registry, WMI
SoftEther VPN	Win / Linux	SSL-VPN, L2TP, OpenVPN	Process, Config
Twingate	Win / Mac / Linux	WireGuard	Process
CyberGhost	Win / Mac	WireGuard, OpenVPN, IKEv2	Process, Registry

IPSec — Internet Protocol Security

All Platforms Config file parse Process scan Service status tychon.ipsec_tunnel

Implementation	Platforms	Config File	IKE Versions
Windows Built-in IPSec	Windows	Registry / PowerShell	IKEv1, IKEv2
strongSwan	Win / Mac / Linux	`ipsec.conf`, `swanctl.conf`	IKEv1, IKEv2
libreswan	Linux	`ipsec.conf`	IKEv1, IKEv2
openswan	Linux (legacy)	`ipsec.conf`	IKEv1
Linux Kernel IPSec (xfrm)	Linux	iproute2 / netstat	IKEv1, IKEv2

Fields captured: protocol (IKEv1/IKEv2), mode (tunnel/transport), authentication method (PSK/certificate/EAP), encryption algorithm, integrity algorithm, DH group, tunnel endpoint addresses.

MACsec — IEEE 802.1AE Layer-2 Encryption

Linux Windows macOS sysfs / ip link Registry (Windows) tychon.macsec

Cipher Suite	Key Length	CNSA 2.0	PQC Readiness	Score
`GCM-AES-256`	256-bit	Yes	safe	80 / 100
`GCM-AES-256-XPN`	256-bit	Yes	safe	80 / 100
`GCM-AES-128`	128-bit	No (CNSA 2.0 requires 256)	transitional	50 / 100
`GCM-AES-128-XPN`	128-bit	No	transitional	50 / 100
Unknown / none	—	No	vulnerable	20 / 100

Additional flags assessed: encrypt (authentication-only vs. confidentiality), replay_protect (replay window size), MKA (802.1X key agreement) enabled, validate: strict/check/disabled.

IBM MQ — Message Queue Channel Encryption

All Platforms Active network probe (port 1414) Direct TLS probe (port 1415) STARTTLS probe (localhost) tychon.non_tls_cipher

IBM MQ uses TLS at the TCP layer — the TLS handshake completes before any MQ protocol bytes are exchanged. On port 1414 (standard listener), a 28-byte MQTSH probe is sent after TLS fails; a TSH signature in the response confirms MQ presence without TLS. Port 1415 (dedicated SSL listener) and port 9443 (MQ REST API) receive a direct TLS ClientHello. TLS-protected MQ channels are also detected by the standard TLS probe and labeled ibmmq+tls.

Configuration	Port	Detection Method	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk	Action
MQ channel with TLS 1.3 + PQC hybrid KEX	1414 / 1415	TLS probe → `ibmmq+tls`	transitional	Medium	Upgrade KEX to X25519MLKEM768 when IBM MQ supports it
MQ channel with TLS 1.2 (ECDHE-AES-GCM)	1414 / 1415	TLS probe → `ibmmq+tls`	transitional	High	Upgrade to TLS 1.3; add PQC hybrid KEX
MQ channel with TLS 1.0 / 1.1 or weak cipher	1414 / 1415	TLS probe → `ibmmq+tls`	vulnerable	Critical	Disable TLS 1.0/1.1; enforce TLS 1.2+ with AEAD ciphers
MQ channel — no TLS (SSLCIPH not set)	1414	MQTSH binary probe	vulnerable	Critical	Set SSLCIPH on all channels; enforce SSLPEER; require TLS 1.2+

MQTSH probe: 28-byte Transmission Segment Header (StrucId="TSH ", SegmentType=INITIAL). IBM MQ responds with a recognizable error frame when TLS is absent, exposing the channel without authentication or encryption. Common IBM MQ process names monitored: amqrmppa, runmqlsr, amqzmgr0.

NFS — Network File System

Linux macOS Active network probe (port 2049) /proc/mounts + /proc/fs/nfsd/exports (Linux) /sbin/mount (macOS) tychon.non_tls_cipher

Local NFS mounts and server exports are parsed from the OS mount table — no network probing required for local detection. For remote scans, port 2049 receives a direct TLS ClientHello (RFC 9289 NFS-over-TLS) first; if TLS fails, a 40-byte ONC RPC NULL call (XID 0x12345678, Program 100003 / NFS, Procedure 0) confirms NFS presence. Security flavor is classified from mount options or export configuration.

Security Flavor (`sec=`)	Encrypted	Auth	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk	Action
`tls` — NFS-over-TLS (RFC 9289)	Yes	TLS certificate	transitional	Medium	Upgrade TLS cipher to 1.3 with PQC hybrid KEX
`krb5p` — Kerberos privacy	Yes (AES256-CTS)	Kerberos	transitional	Medium	Symmetric AES is quantum-safe; Kerberos session KEX is not — await PQC Kerberos RFC
`krb5i` — Kerberos integrity	No (data plaintext)	Kerberos + HMAC	vulnerable	High	Upgrade to `krb5p` for data encryption or migrate to NFS-over-TLS
`krb5` — Kerberos auth only	No	Kerberos	vulnerable	High	Upgrade to `krb5p` for data encryption or migrate to NFS-over-TLS
`sys` — AUTH_SYS (UID/GID)	No	None (spoofable)	vulnerable	Critical	Replace with `krb5p` or NFS-over-TLS immediately; AUTH_SYS provides no real authentication
No security (NFSv2 / v3, no sec option)	No	None	vulnerable	Critical	Upgrade to NFSv4.1+ with Kerberos or NFS-over-TLS

NFS version detected from mount options (vers= or nfsvers=). Linux server exports are read from /proc/fs/nfsd/exports; client mounts from /proc/mounts. macOS mount table parsed via /sbin/mount. Windows NFS stub returns no results (Windows NFS client usage is rare in enterprise environments). Remote detection: port 2049 labeled nfs+tls when TLS succeeds.

X.509 Certificates — Filesystem Scanning

All Platforms Filesystem walk PEM / DER / PKCS12 / JKS tychon.filesystem_certificate tychon.keystore_certificate

Key Algorithm	Key Size / Curve	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk	Migration Priority
RSA	< 2048 bits	vulnerable	Critical	Critical
RSA	2048 bits	transitional	High	High
RSA	3072 / 4096+ bits	transitional	High	Medium
ECDSA	P-256 / P-384 / P-521	transitional	High	High
ED25519	255 bits (Curve25519)	transitional	Medium	Medium
DSA	1024 / 2048 bits	vulnerable	Critical	Critical

Cert metadata captured: subject, issuer, serial, not-before, not-after, SHA-1 and SHA-256 fingerprints, key usage / EKU, SANs, chain depth, CRL/OCSP endpoints, FIPS 140 certification flag, signature algorithm.

Keystores — JKS, PKCS12, and System Stores

All Platforms Filesystem walk OS store APIs tychon.keystore tychon.keystore_certificate

Keystore Format	Extension(s)	Platform	Encryption Assessed
JKS — Java KeyStore	`.jks`	All (Java)	PBEWithSHA1AndDESede (weak), AES-256 (strong)
PKCS#12	`.p12`, `.pfx`	All	PBKDF2, PKCS12KDF; AES-256-CBC; MAC SHA-256
PEM	`.pem`, `.crt`, `.cer`, `.key`	All	AES-128/256-CBC passphrase encryption detected
DER	`.der`, `.cer`	All	Binary format; no container encryption
Windows Certificate Store	Registry	Windows	CNG encryption for private keys
macOS Keychain	Security framework	macOS	Secure Enclave or system keychain encryption
Linux NSS database	`cert8.db`, `cert9.db`	Linux	SQLite3 / Berkeley DB; PBKDF2
Linux system CA store	`/etc/ssl/certs/`, `/var/lib/ca-certificates/`	Linux	Public roots only; no private key material

macOS Keychain Identities (certificate + private key pairs)

macOS only Security framework — SecItemCopyMatching SecKeyCopyAttributes (no key export) tychon.application tychon.keystore_certificate

The Security framework SecItemCopyMatching(kSecClassIdentity) enumerates all certificate+private key pairs in the process's keychain search list (login + System keychains). Private key bytes never leave securityd or the Secure Enclave — only metadata is accessed via SecKeyCopyAttributes. Common identities include Microsoft AAD, GlobalProtect VPN, and MDM enrollment certificates.

Key Type	Bits / Curve	PQC Readiness	Quantum Risk	Migration Priority
RSA	< 2048	vulnerable	Critical	Critical
RSA	2048	transitional	High	High
RSA	3072 / 4096+	transitional	High	Medium
EC (ECDSA)	P-256 / P-384 / P-521	transitional	High	High
ED25519	255-bit Curve25519	transitional	Medium	Medium

Cryptographic Libraries — Memory and Process Scanning

All Platforms Process memory maps /proc/{pid}/maps (Linux) Mach VM APIs (macOS) VirtualQueryEx (Windows) tychon.crypto_library tychon.java_crypto_library

Library	Min PQC-Capable Version	PQC Status	PQC Algorithms	Notes
OpenSSL	3.5.0+ (Apr 2025)	PQC Capable	ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA (FIPS 140-3)	Via built-in FIPS provider
OpenSSL	3.0 – 3.4	Partial	ML-KEM (oqs-provider only)	OQS provider required
OpenSSL	< 3.0	Not Capable	None	EOL; upgrade required
LibreSSL	—	Not Capable	None	OpenSSL 1.x API compatibility fork
BoringSSL (Google)	2023+	Partial	X25519Kyber768 hybrid (TLS only)	No standalone PQC API
NSS (Mozilla)	3.94+ (Oct 2024)	Partial	ML-KEM-768 hybrid (TLS 1.3)	IETF draft spec; Firefox 132+
Mbed TLS	3.6.0+	Partial	ML-KEM (experimental)	Requires compile-time flag; not production-ready
wolfSSL	5.7.0+	Partial	ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA	Compile-time flags required; FIPS module is paid
Botan	3.4.0+	PQC Capable	ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA (finalized)	Full NIST FIPS 203/204/205 implementation
Botan	3.0 – 3.3	Partial	Draft Kyber / Dilithium	Pre-standardization drafts
GnuTLS	—	Not Capable	None	No mainline PQC as of 2026
Apple Security (CommonCrypto, CoreTLS, CryptoKit)	—	Not Capable	None	No public PQC APIs as of 2026
Windows SChannel / CNG / CAPI	—	Not Capable	None	No native PQC as of 2026; Preview available in Insider
BouncyCastle (Java)	1.77+ (beta)	Partial	ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA (beta)	Detected via Java process memory scan

Private key bytes are never read from memory. Library detection uses shared-object paths, version strings, and module signatures found in process memory maps. Java crypto libraries are detected via class loading patterns in the JVM heap.

Quantum Readiness Assessment — Scoring Model

All Platforms tychon.quantum_readiness tychon.pqc_inventory

The quantum readiness score is a composite of four independently scored dimensions. Scores influence the letter-grade (A–F) and readiness status reported in tychon.quantum_readiness.

Dimension	Max Score	Key Factors
Hardware	40 pts	CPU architecture (x86_64/ARM64), AES-NI, AVX2/NEON instructions, RAM capacity, TPM version, HSM presence, Secure Boot
OS & Crypto API	30 pts	OS version / patch level, TLS 1.3 native support, FIPS mode enabled, modern cipher API availability, IPv6 support
Crypto Libraries	20 pts	OpenSSL version, PQC-capable libraries detected, no legacy library presence
Network	10 pts	Estimated bandwidth, TLS 1.3 negotiation success rate, IPv6 availability

Kerberos Score Impact (Windows only): DES enabled: −15 pts | RC4 explicit: −10 pts | RC4 OS default: −5 pts | AES-only explicit: 0 penalty. Score is floored at 0.

All NDJSON event.dataset Values

event.dataset	event.action	Protocol / Source	One event per
`tychon.cipher`	cipher_negotiation	TLS (all versions)	Negotiated cipher suite per port
`tychon.cipher_quick`	quick_cipher_scan	TLS (fast path)	Single negotiated suite per port
`tychon.ssh`	ssh_crypto_detected	SSH	SSH algorithm set per port
`tychon.non_tls_cipher`	non_tls_cipher_detected	SMB3, SNMPv3, Kerberos, SMTP, IMAP, LDAP, PostgreSQL, IBM MQ, NFS	One cipher profile per detected protocol instance
`tychon.vpn_client`	vpn_client_detected	VPN clients	Detected VPN client installation
`tychon.ipsec_tunnel`	ipsec_tunnel_detected	IPSec	IPSec tunnel or policy
`tychon.macsec`	macsec_interface_detected	MACsec	MACsec interface
`tychon.filesystem_certificate`	certificate_discovered	Filesystem	X.509 certificate file
`tychon.keystore_certificate`	keystore_discovered	JKS / PKCS12 / etc.	Certificate within a keystore
`tychon.keystore`	keystore_discovered	JKS / PKCS12 / etc.	Keystore file (summary)
`tychon.crypto_library`	crypto_library_detected	Memory scan	Crypto library per process
`tychon.java_crypto_library`	crypto_library_detected	JVM memory scan	Java crypto library per process
`tychon.quantum_readiness`	quantum_readiness_assessed	Composite assessment	One per scan
`tychon.pqc_inventory`	pqc_inventory	App + port pairs	Application + port with cipher data
`tychon.application`	application_detected	App-centric mode	Application (process executable)
`tychon.connected_quick`	connected_quick_scan	Active connections	Outbound connection probe
`tychon.installed_app`	installed_app_detected	OS app registry	Installed application
`tychon.browser_extension`	browser_extension_detected	Browser profiles	Browser extension

PQC Assessment Quick-Reference Matrix

Algorithm / Configuration	Protocol Context	pqc_readiness	quantum_risk	migration_priority	Reason
ML-KEM hybrid KEX (X25519+ML-KEM-768)	TLS 1.3	safe	Low	Low	NIST FIPS 203; CNSA 2.0 compliant
AES-256-GCM (symmetric)	TLS, SMB3, MACsec, IPSec	safe	Low	Low	256-bit key resists Grover's algorithm
AES-128-GCM (symmetric)	TLS, SMB3, MACsec	safe	Low	Low	128-bit effectively 64-bit post-Grover; acceptable
ChaCha20-Poly1305 (symmetric)	TLS, WireGuard VPN	safe	Low	Low	256-bit key symmetric; quantum-safe
ECDHE key exchange	TLS 1.2 / 1.3	transitional	High	High	Shor's algorithm breaks ECDH on a CRQC
DHE key exchange	TLS 1.2	transitional	High	High	Shor's algorithm breaks discrete logarithm
RSA key exchange / signature	TLS, certificates	transitional	High	High	Shor's algorithm factors RSA modulus
ECDSA / ED25519 signatures	Certificates, SSH	transitional	High	High	Shor's algorithm breaks ECC
AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (Kerberos)	Kerberos	transitional	Medium	Medium	Symmetric AES session; no PQC Kerberos standard yet
AES-256 SNMPv3 priv + SHA-256 auth	SNMPv3	transitional	Low	Low	Best available; no PQC SNMPv3 standard yet
SHA-1 / MD5 MACs	TLS, SSH, SNMPv3	vulnerable	High	High	Classical collision attacks (Grover accelerates)
3DES / Triple-DES	TLS, IPSec, SNMPv3, Kerberos	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	SWEET32 (classical); 112-bit key = 56-bit post-Grover
RC4	TLS, Kerberos	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	Classically broken; RFC 7465 prohibits in TLS
DES	Kerberos, SNMPv3, SMB	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	56-bit key; broken classically since 1998
NULL encryption	TLS	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	No encryption — authentication only
RSA < 2048 bits	Certificates, TLS key exchange	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	Below minimum classical security; quantum makes it worse
SMBv1	SMB	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	No encryption; WannaCry; EternalBlue
SNMPv1 / v2c (community strings)	SNMP	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	Cleartext; no authentication integrity
IBM MQ — no TLS (SSLCIPH not set)	IBM MQ	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	Plaintext message queues; no authentication or encryption
IBM MQ — TLS 1.2+ channel	IBM MQ	transitional	High	High	Classical asymmetric KEX; upgrade to TLS 1.3 + PQC hybrid
NFS `sec=sys` / no sec	NFS	vulnerable	Critical	Critical	No encryption, no real authentication (UID/GID spoofable)
NFS `sec=krb5` / `krb5i`	NFS	vulnerable	High	High	Auth only or integrity only; data in plaintext
NFS `sec=krb5p`	NFS	transitional	Medium	Medium	AES256-CTS data encryption; KEX is quantum-vulnerable
NFS-over-TLS (RFC 9289)	NFS	transitional	Medium	Medium	TLS 1.3 with classical KEX; add PQC hybrid group

Platform Coverage Matrix

Detection Category	Windows	macOS	Linux	Detection Method
TLS / SSL cipher scanning	✓	✓	✓	Active TCP probe
SSH algorithm scanning	✓	✓	✓	Active TCP probe
SMB3 encryption (network probe)	✓	✓	✓	TCP NEGOTIATE packet
SMB encryption enforcement	✓	—	—	Registry: LanmanServer\EncryptData
SNMPv3 (config file)	—	✓	✓	Parse /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf
SNMP service (Windows v1/v2c)	✓	—	—	Registry: services\SNMP
Kerberos enctypes (registry)	✓	—	—	Registry: SupportedEncryptionTypes bitmask
Kerberos enctypes (krb5.conf)	—	✓	✓	Parse /etc/krb5.conf [libdefaults]
VPN client detection	✓	✓	✓	Process, Registry, Config files
IPSec tunnel detection	✓	✓	✓	Config files, service status, process
MACsec interface detection	✓	✓	✓	sysfs, ip link, Registry
Filesystem certificate scan	✓	✓	✓	Walk configured paths
Windows Certificate Store	✓	—	—	CryptoAPI / Windows registry
macOS Keychain identities	—	✓	—	Security framework (CGO)
Linux NSS database	—	—	✓	SQLite / BDB cert9.db
JKS / PKCS12 keystores	✓	✓	✓	Filesystem walk + OpenSSL
Crypto library memory scan	✓	✓	✓	Process memory maps + version detection
Java crypto library scan	✓	✓	✓	JVM heap / class path analysis
Quantum readiness scoring	✓	✓	✓	Composite of all above
NTLM LmCompatibilityLevel	✓	—	—	Registry — `HKLM\...\Lsa\LmCompatibilityLevel`
UEFI / Secure Boot firmware type	✓	✓	✓	Registry (Win) / EFI sysfs (Linux) / hardware assumption (macOS)
WiFi encryption (active connection)	✓	✓	✓	WLAN profile XML (Win) / wpa_supplicant + NM conf (Linux) / interface detection (macOS)
STARTTLS cipher probing	✓	✓	✓	Protocol-native handshake: SMTP, IMAP, LDAP, PostgreSQL on localhost
IBM MQ channel detection (port 1414)	✓	✓	✓	MQTSH binary probe (no TLS) + standard TLS probe (TLS channels)
IBM MQ SSL listener (port 1415)	✓	✓	✓	Direct TLS ClientHello
NFS client mount detection	—	✓	✓	macOS: `/sbin/mount` \| Linux: `/proc/mounts`
NFS server export detection	—	—	✓	Linux: `/proc/fs/nfsd/exports`
NFS remote probe (port 2049)	✓	✓	✓	TLS ClientHello (RFC 9289) + ONC RPC NULL call fallback

Coverage at a Glance

Table of Contents